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THE PRICE DECLINE ANOMALY IN CHRISTMAS SEASON
INTERNET AUCTIONS OF PS3s
Thomas Andrews, Cynthia Benzing, and Matthew Fehnel
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
This paper examines 3,797 eBay auctions of Playstation 3s (PS3) during Christmas season 2006 to
determine how the time remaining until Christmas and the supply of goods influence a bidder’s willingness to pay
for a good. The number of days between the auction end date and Christmas influenced the bid, with higher final
bids occurring earlier in the Christmas season. This evidence of a “holiday price decline anomaly” means that sellers
who sold earlier in the holiday season were more likely to obtain higher bids than those who sold later. The final bid
was also influenced by the eBay supply, such that the greater the number of auctions ending around the same time,
the lower the final bid.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, growth in e-commerce
holiday sales has been unparalleled in the retail
industry. According to the U.S. Department of
Commerce (2010), e-commerce retail sales in the
fourth quarter of 2006 were 24% higher than they
were in the same quarter one year before. Online
spending between Thanksgiving and Christmas grew
21% between 2006 and 2007 (comScore, Inc., 2007)
Unique names like “Cyber Monday” and “Green
Monday” have been given to the Monday after
Thanksgiving and the Monday two weeks later
because e-commerce retail activity on these days is
generally stronger than other days during the
Christmas season. Auction sites like eBay exhibit
similar seasonal patterns of online sales;
consequently, they report their strongest sales during
the fourth quarter of each year. Because auction
markets generate quality sales data on pricing, these
data can provide information about how buyer, seller,
market, and product characteristics affect a
consumer’s willingness-to-pay and final bid during
the Christmas season.
Data from almost 4,000 eBay auctions were
examined to determine how supply and time to
Christmas affected a bidder’s willingness-to-pay for
PlayStation 3s (PS3) during the 2006 Christmas
season. This study is one of only a few (Chan,
Kadiyali & Park, 2007; McDonald & Slawson, 2002;
Melnik & Alm, 2005) that explicitly includes a
supply variable, and one of only two (Halcoussis &
Mathews, 2007) that examines the “price decline
anomaly” over a multi-day period culminating in an
event. While many economists have observed the
“price decline anomaly” in sequential auctions over

the same day, this study examines how time to an
event, like Christmas, might affect a bidder’s
willingness-to-pay for a good. Only three articles
have examined the behavior of retail prices during
the Thanksgiving–Christmas holiday period. These
studies (Levy, Chen, Müller, Dutta, & Bergen, 2010;
Müller, Bergen, Dutta, & Levy, 2006; and Müller,
Bergen, Dutta, & Levy, 2007) of food and basic
items sold in supermarkets found greater price
rigidity during the holiday season. This study
explores how the willingness-to-pay for a popular
new game system, likely to be a gift, varies during
the holiday season when purchased through online
auctions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
During the last ten years, many researchers have
studied how prices are determined in Internet
auctions, but few have analyzed how supply and time
until an event affect the bid price. This study uses the
example of PS3 gaming systems to determine
whether the willingness-to-pay during the holiday
season is related to its supply availability on the
Internet auction site and the number of days until
Christmas.
Economic theory suggests that the level of
competitiveness influences prices. The greater the
supply offered and the lower the demand, the lower
the bids or price. In McDonald and Slawson’s (2002)
study of collector Barbie doll auctions on eBay, final
price decreased as the number of auctions ending on
the same day increased. Melnik and Alm (2005) also
found a decrease in the final price of coins sold at
eBay auctions as the number of auctions ending on
the same day increased. According to a study of
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2,322 auctions of notebook computers in the Korean
Internet market (Chan, Kadiyali & Park, 2007), the
willingness-to-pay declined as the number of similar
products listed concurrently increased. During the
2006 holiday season, the availability of PS3s
fluctuated due to manufacturing issues. Although the
supply was severely limited at initial offering, the
supply did not decline monotonically toward
Christmas. For that reason, the eBay supply is
examined independent of the number of days until
Christmas. This study expects the eBay supply to
have a significant effect on the willingness-to-pay
with fewer offered PS3s resulting in a greater
willingness-to-pay.
Studies of in-person auctions have observed a
“price decline anomaly” for sequential auctions that
occur during the same day. Ashenfelter (1989) and
McAfee and Vincent (1993) observed that prices in
sequential auctions of wine decline as the auctions
proceed, such that bidders are willing to pay more
early in the day and less later in the day for identical
cases of wine. This effect has been observed in
English auctions of livestock (Buccola, 1982), real
estate (Ashenfelter & Genesove, 1992), art (Beggs &
Graddy, 1997) and porcelain objects recovered from
shipwrecks (Ginsburgh & van Ours, 2007). Three
researchers, van den Berg, van Ours, and Pradhan
(2001), observed the same effect in Dutch auctions of
flower bulbs. In some cases the effect has been
attributed to the decline in the quality of lots as the
day or auction proceeds (Beggs & Graddy, 1997).
For auctions involving homogeneous goods, the
effect has been attributed to auction rules that allow
the winner of the first lot the option of buying future
similar lots at the same price. This rule creates a
valuable option related to the first sale. In contrast to
the aforementioned auction studies, Raviv (2006)
found that prices in an in-person used car auction
actually increased early in the auction and then
stabilized. Raviv concluded that, in car auctions,
bidders may need to “warm up” and tend to bid lower
at the beginning of the day. In addition, bidders take
time to adjust to asymmetric information in the early
rounds of a used car auction.
The declining price phenomenon has been
explained a number of ways. The decline in prices in
auctions of homogeneous goods may be related to the
opportunity cost of waiting for the next auction.
Buyers may be willing to pay a premium equal to the
value of the personal time saved by securing the
product earlier. Further, buyers may be willing to pay
a premium in an earlier auction to avoid future
uncertainty. Risk averse buyers may be willing to pay
more to eliminate the probability that supply may be
even less in the future or demand and prices may be
even higher. This study hypothesizes that the same

day price decline anomaly will not be a determining
factor of final bid prices in eBay auctions of PS3s.
Because an Internet auction can begin and end at any
time of day, the same day effect would not be
observable because the earliest time period of the day
is not necessarily when bidding would begin, and the
end of the day is not necessarily when an Internet
auction ends. In other words, the rolling effect of the
auctions would reduce any same day effect on price.
Only one study of Internet auctions has
examined the price decline anomaly with respect to
simultaneous and sequential Internet auctions over a
number of days until the occurrence of an event.
Halcoussis and Mathews (2007) studied the price of
concert tickets for a rock band and found that a
variable representing the length of time between the
close of an auction and the concert was directly
related to the price paid. According to Halcoussis and
Mathews, the price declined $0.93 per day per ticket
as the auction’s end date approached the date of the
concert. Because the product was not usable until the
concert, this is similar to the purchase of a Christmas
gift that is not usable until Christmas. On the other
hand, in contrast to a concert ticket, a PlayStation 3
would be usable for an extended period (perhaps
years) after the date of purchase. Also, PlayStation 3s
may be purchased for purposes other than Christmas
and, in that case, may not be subject to a price decline
anomaly leading up to December 25.
Relatively few studies have examined price
behavior during the Thanksgiving–Christmas holiday
period. In one study of foods and basic items sold in
supermarkets during the Thanksgiving–Christmas
holiday period, Müller et al. (2006) found greater
price rigidity for private label products relative to
nationally branded products. Examining similar
supermarket products during the Christmas season,
Müller et al. (2007) found that fewer new products
are introduced or discontinued during this period.
Lastly, Levi et al. (2010) concluded that retail prices
of supermarket items are more rigid during the
holiday period because of the opportunity cost related
to changing prices. During the busier holiday season,
stores must use more resources to stock shelves,
answer customer questions, and ring up sales. There
are fewer resources available to re-price products.
HYPOTHESES
This is the first study to examine the willingnessto-pay for a popular entertainment system during the
Christmas season. The newly released model of
PlayStation was more likely to become a Christmas
gift than the food and basic items tracked in previous
studies. In contrast to supermarket studies by Müller
et al. (2007) and Levi et al. (2010), the prices in an
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auction are very flexible since they can be adjusted
with relatively no cost to the buyer, seller, or auction
site. This study hypothesizes that the greater
flexibility in prices (and, consequently, final bid)
could result in an observable pattern during a holiday
season that extends in this case from the introduction
of the PS3 (November 17) to seven days before
Christmas. Since the time period culminates with a
significant event, it is hypothesized that the “price
decline anomaly” will be observable over the entire
time period, such that higher final bid prices will be
observable at the beginning of the holiday season.
This “holiday price decline anomaly” would tend to
exist for the same reasons as the same day price
decline anomaly. Gift buyers are more willing to pay
a premium to secure a popular item early in the
holiday season to avoid the risk of paying a higher
price later or perhaps not even obtaining the item
because it has sold out.
The two hypotheses tested in this study are as
follows:
Hypothesis #1: The final bid will be inversely
related to the eBay supply of PS3s, such that
fewer offered PS3s will result in a greater
final bid.
Hypothesis #2: The final bid will be directly
related to the number of days until Christmas,
such that the greater the number of days until
Christmas the greater the final bid. This result
would support the “holiday price decline
anomaly.”
THE DATA
The data used in this study were drawn from
eBay auctions of PS3s with at least one bidder that
ended between November 17, 2006 and December
18, 2006 (seven days prior to Christmas day). At the
time of this study, eBay supplied historical auction
data, but these data were less comprehensive than
those available today. For instance, neither the buy-itnow (BIN) price nor the final price was included in
the historical information for closed auctions. The
variables obtained for each closed auction were the
following: the final bid, the characteristics of the
product, shipping costs, the number of other
competing auctions, the total number of bids, and the
time the auction ended.
On November 17, 2006 the much anticipated
PS3 was released in North America. The release of
the PS3 had been delayed numerous times in 2006, so
Sony decided to release the game system in
November despite its inability to meet expected
demand. According to pricing theory, a shortage or

constrained supply in the face of strong demand
should lead to increases in the price of a product. The
PS3 is an example of a product considered in short
supply when it was released in November 2006.
Thousands of consumers were quick to buy the
product at the manufacturer’s suggested retail price
only to resell it at a premium on an Internet auction
site. These “scalpers” could choose to sell the PS3s
immediately after release of the product or sell them
closer to Christmas. If there exists some pattern to
holiday retail prices, the timing decision could
significantly influence the price or high bid received.
All PS3 auctions with at least one bid were
considered whether the auction resulted in a sale or
not. Auctions do not always result in a sale if, for
example, the seller has specified a minimum
acceptable bid (the reserve price) and this reserve has
not been met. Auctions that offered multiple units of
the PS3 or other unrelated products were removed
from the sample. Four bids that were more than three
standard deviations outside the mean were removed
from the sample. These bids might be the result of
shill bidding which occurs when a seller bids on his
or her own item to either elicit higher bids from
potential buyers or to cancel a sale at less than the
seller’s reserve price. Auctions occurring within
seven days of Christmas were deleted because these
items were less likely to be received before the
Christmas holiday and were, therefore, less likely to
have been purchased as holiday gifts. The number of
remaining auctions with at least one bid was 3,797.
The variables are defined in Table 1. The descriptive
statistics for each variable are shown in Table 2.
The reputation of the seller was not included in
the dataset because reputation ratings were not
included in eBay’s historical data summary page used
in this study. Although reputation could have been
obtained from the seller’s account information, the
reputation at the time it was obtained could have been
different from the reputation rating at the time of the
auction. In addition, most studies (Melnik & Alm,
2002; Melnik & Alm, 2005; Houser & Wooders,
2006; and Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, & Reeves, 2000),
have shown that the reputation effect is a relatively
small component of the final price with stronger
reputational effects for non-homogeneous items.
The number of bidders was not available on
eBay’s historical dataset, only the number of bids. As
a result, the number of bids was used as a proxy for
demand and is an imperfect measure of the number of
customers seeking the product. Similar to Snir (2006)
this study includes the number of bids on the premise
that the number of bids is a reflection of bidding
intensity and demand.
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Table 1
Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent
Variable
BID

Independent
Variables
SUPPLY1

SUPPLY24

DAYS
GB

BUNDLE
GAME
CONT
MOVIE
SHIP

NUMBIDS
TIME1
TIME2
TIME3
WKEND

Description
Final bid ($) if the PlayStation
was not sold and price (which
may or may not be the final bid)
for PS3s that were sold.

60GB = 53%; 20GB = 47%

BUNDLE

Bundle = 4%; no bundle =
96%
Game = 6%; no game =
94%
Extra controller = 5%; no
extra controller = 95%
Movie = 3%; no movie =
97%
Mean = $32; S.D. = $32
(Shipping paid by seller in
27% of auctions)
Mean = 13; S.D. = 11

GAME
CONT
MOVIE
SHIP

The number of other PS3s being
auctioned in the hour around that
particular auction.
The number of PS3s being
auctioned in the 24 hours
around that particular auction.
Number of days until Christmas
as of the end of the auction.
Dummy = 1 if unit is 60
gigabytes; 0 if unit is 20
gigabytes.
Dummy = 1 if the unit includes a
player bundle.
Dummy = 1 if the unit includes
at least 2 games with the PS3.
Dummy = 1 if the unit includes
an extra controller.
Dummy = 1 if the unit includes
at least one movie.
Cost ($) of shipping the PS3.
The SHIP variable = 0 if costs
are paid by the seller.
Number of bids
Dummy = 1 if the auction ends
between 12 AM and 6 AM.
Dummy = 1 if the auction ends
between 6 AM and 12 PM.
Dummy = 1 if the auction ends
between 12 PM and 6 PM.
Dummy = 1 if the auction ends
on a weekend; 0 if the auction
ends on a weekday.

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables
(N = 3,797)
Variable

Descriptive Statistics

SUPPLY1

Mean = 23; S.D. = 19

SUPPLY24

Mean = 253; S.D. = 155

BID

GB

Mean = $800; S.D. = $254

NUMBIDS
TIME1
TIME2
TIME3
WKEND

Time1 = 6%; other times =
94%
Time2 = 25%; other times =
75%
Time3 = 37%; other times =
63%
Weekend = 13%; weekday
= 87%
THE MODEL

In this study, regression analysis was used to
explain variation in the final bid prices of PS3s based
on the (eBay) supply of PS3s, the number of days
until Christmas, as well as several other control
variables. As described in the literature review
section of this paper, this study hypothesizes that
supply will be inversely related to the final bid and a
price decline anomaly will be observable over the
holiday season instead of over a day. The dependent
variable represents the willingness-to-pay (BID). BID
is the highest observed bid for items that received at
least one bid. For items that did not sell, BID is the
most any participating bidder was willing to pay. For
items that did sell, the observed sale price (BID)
might not reflect the highest willingness to pay
because the winning bidder need only outbid the
second highest bidder. Any amount that the winning
bidder was willing to pay above what was required to
win the auction is unobserved.
In addition to the independent variables of
interest (the number of other competing auctions and
the number of days until Christmas), there are other
independent variables that must be included to avoid
an omitted variable bias. Five of these variables are
related to the characteristics of the PS3 and include
the gigabytes, and whether the game system has a
bundle, a game, a controller, and/or a movie. Further,
prior research has identified several additional
variables that affect final prices and/or bids in eBay
auctions. These additional independent variables are
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related to shipping costs; the number of bids; and
when the auction ends. The product variables related
to gigabytes and add-ons are expected to be
positively related to the final bid. Based on the results
of prior research, the number of bids variable is also
expected to be positively related to the final bid,
while the shipping costs variable is expected to be
negative. Because the results of prior research on the
effect of time on final bid/price have not been
consistent, we do not hypothesize signs for the
variables related to time the auction ends. More
detailed discussion of the independent variables and
their expected signs will follow.
The regression model is shown below. The
expected sign of the coefficient appears in
parentheses above the independent variable.
()
(+)
(+)
BIDi = β0+ β1 SUPPLYi + β2 DAYSi + β3 GBi
(+)
(+)
(+)
+ β4 BUNDLEi + β5 GAMEi + β6 CONTi
(+)
()
(+)
+ β7 MOVIEi + β8 SHIPi + β9 NUMBIDSi
+ β10 TIME1i + β11 TIME2i + β12 TIME3i
+ β13 WKENDi

(1)

Two supply variables were tested to determine
the effect that the eBay supply of PS3s might have on
final bid price. One supply variable (SUPPLY1)
measures the total number of PS3 auctions ending in
the hour before and after a particular auction. The
other supply variable (SUPPLY24) is a broader
measure that measures the total number of PS3
auctions ending within 24 hours of a particular
auction. Studies by Melnik and Alm (2005) and
McDonald and Slawson (2002) also measured supply
as the number of auctions ending on the same day.
The supply variables used in this model are limited in
that the eBay supply of PS3s is only a small part of
the total supply available. The market supply of PS3s
would include those available in brick-and-mortar
retailers like Toys-R-Us and GameStop, as well as
other online retailers. Unfortunately, information
about the total market supply of PS3s on a given day
was not available. One might still hypothesize that
the eBay supply of PS3s might be relevant if eBay
bidders have customer allegiance to the site and limit
their online purchases to eBay (as opposed to other
auction or retail sites).
As discussed in the literature review section, the
price decline anomaly is more likely to be observed
over the course of the Christmas shopping season in
that buyers might be more willing to pay higher
prices earlier in the season to reduce the risk of not

being able to secure the product later in the season.
As a result, we expect the number of days to
Christmas (DAYS) to be directly related to the
willingness-to-pay, such that the final bid is higher
for PS3s auctioned earlier in the Christmas season.
A challenge with this analysis is that the product
is
not
homogeneous.
Consequently,
the
characteristics of each PS3 are expected to influence
the final bid. The PS3 came in two basic models in
2006: 20GB and 60GB (which was called the
Premium model). One would expect the 60GB model
to command a higher price and, therefore, a higher
bid. Since the dummy variable for the model is 1 for
60GB and 0 for 20GB, the sign of the coefficient for
GB is expected to be positive. PlayStation auctions
can also include “bundles.” Some bundles are created
by the seller and include additional games, videos,
and controllers. Other bundles were included by the
manufacturer and could include specified additional
games and possibly another controller. PlayStations
with bundles should command higher bids. This
study does not distinguish between manufacturer or
seller bundles. Independent of whether the PS3
comes with a bundle, some PS3s come with
additional games, an additional controller, and/or
additional movies. In other words, a PS3 may have a
bundle and controller in addition to the bundle; or a
PS3 may not have a bundle, but may only have an
additional controller. If a PS3 has a bundle,
additional games, an additional controller, and/or at
least one movie, one would expect the bid to be
higher. As a result, the coefficients for BUNDLE,
GAME, CONT, and MOVIE are all expected to be
positive.
When shipping costs are borne by the buyer, the
buyer is likely to adjust the bid downward to reflect
the additional costs (McDonald & Slawson, 2002;
Melnik & Alm, 2005). Online sellers have the option
of paying shipping costs themselves or requiring
buyers to pay the shipping costs. Studies have shown
that higher nominal shipping costs reduce the highest
bid (McDonald & Slawson, 2002). Melnik and Alm
(2005) found that a $1 increase in shipping costs will
decrease
the
willingness-to-pay by $0.55.
Consequently, the coefficient for SHIP is expected to
be negative.
The bid price is expected to be positively related
to the demand for PS3s. As a result, the coefficient
for the variable related to the number of bids
(NUMBIDS) should be positive.
The effect of time of day on final price or final
bid has been ambiguous and may be affected by the
type of buyer and type of product. Andrews and
Benzing (2007) found higher prices in eBay auctions
of used cars that ended in the evening (between 5:00
PM and midnight). McDonald and Slawson (2002)
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found significantly lower high bids for auctions of
collectible Barbie dolls ending between midnight and
4 AM. Melnik and Alm (2005) found that time of day
was not significant in online auctions of certified
coins, but higher bids were received for non-certified
coins sold between midnight and 6 AM. Snir (2006)
found that used laptops auctioned later in the day on
eBay received a lower price than similar ones offered
earlier in the day. To make comparison with Melnik
and Alm (2005) easier, this study broke the day into
six hour increments such that TIME1 includes all
auctions that ended between 12 AM and 6 AM
Pacific time. The price decline anomaly observed in
in-person auctions would not be related to time of
day for PS3 Internet auctions because the auctions in
this study are often rolling, multi-day auctions. There
is no reason to believe that time of day will have any
effect on the final bid.
Previous research on whether the final bid is
higher for auctions ending on a weekend versus those
ending during the week has yielded conflicting
results. Standifird (2001) and Dewan and Hsu (2004)
found that Internet auctions ending on the weekend
had lower final bids and/or prices than auctions
ending during the week. Melnik and Alm’s (2005)
study of noncertified coin auctions on the Internet
found higher prices for auctions ending on the
weekend. There is no reason to expect a weekend or
weekday effect for PS3s during the holiday season.
RESULTS
Two regressions were performed to determine
which variables most significantly influenced the
final bid on PS3s during the 2006 Christmas season.
White’s test statistic for heteroscedasticity was
computed for the preliminary regression. The statistic
was significant indicating that there was
heteroscedasticity of an unknown cause. To correct
for the understatement of the error, the regression
was
recomputed
using
White’s
(1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariance methodology. Table 3 presents the OLS
regression results. The correlation matrix of all
independent variables is shown in Table 4.
The results for the first regression indicate that
the characteristics of the PS3 as well as the shipping
costs, eBay supply, and number of days until
Christmas have a significant effect on the final bid
price. As hypothesized (hypotheses #1 and #2), the
final bid was inversely related to supply and directly
related to the number of days until Christmas. The
number of bids, time of day, and weekend variables
had no significant effect on the high bid. The
NUMBIDS variable represented the number of bids in
an auction and is only partially representative of the

market demand for PS3s at a given time. Had data
been available on the number of bidders instead of
the number of bids, the results might have shown a
significant demand effect.
The second regression is a variation of the first
regression using SUPPLY24 instead of SUPPLY1.
SUPPLY1 includes all PS3 auctions ending within
one hour of an auction; SUPPLY24 refers to all PS3
auctions ending within 24 hours of an auction. As
shown in the first regression, the number of PS3
auctions ending in the hour before or after an auction
(SUPPLY1) was inversely related to the willingnessto-pay. For every additional auction, the final bid was
reduced $1.38. If the supply variable was broadened
to include all auctions that ended within 24 hours of
an auction (SUPPLY24), the final bid was reduced by
$0.16 per auction. Although this may seem like a
small nominal amount, the average number of
auctions ending within 24 hours of an auction was an
average of 253. This result supports hypothesis #1
that supply has an inverse relationship to the
willingness-to-pay.
According to the results, buyers were willing to
spend approximately $156–$159 more for the 60
gigabyte version of the PS3. Bundles, extra games
and an extra controller also added value. In contrast,
an extra movie did not show a statistically significant
relationship to the final bid.
Shipping costs could be shifted to the buyer
without a one-to-one reduction in the highest bid. For
every dollar in shipping costs absorbed by the buyer,
the seller only lost between $0.30 and $0.34. This
means that it is in the seller’s interest to shift
shipping costs to the buyer. This result is similar to
that observed by McDonald and Slawson (2002) and
Melnik and Alm (2005).
Auctions that ended farther before Christmas got
higher final bids than auctions ending nearer to
Christmas. The coefficient for DAYS supports
hypothesis #2, the “holiday price decline anomaly”
for simultaneous, multi-day online auctions. As
hypothesized, the willingness-to-pay was lower in
later auctions of identical items. The positive
coefficients in both regressions indicate that the final
bid decreased by approximately $12 per day as the
number of days before Christmas decreased. The
results are most directly comparable to Halcoussis
and Mathews (2007) who reported a decline in the
price paid for concert tickets as the auction’s end date
approached the concert date. In this study the price
decline anomaly is consistent with buyer risk
aversion. Buyers may be willing to pay a price
premium earlier in the holiday shopping season to
avoid the risk of not obtaining the item in time for
Christmas or of paying a higher price later in the
season. The “holiday price decline anomaly”
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observed in this study may be stronger than that for
most products because the PS3 game systems were in
short supply during Christmas season 2006 and, thus,
buyers faced greater uncertainty than they might face
for other holiday gift items.
From a seller’s perspective, the “holiday price
decline anomaly” indicates that sellers of a product in
short supply might experience higher bids earlier in
the holiday season rather than later. It should be
noted that, although the number of similar auctions
on eBay was considered in the SUPPLY variable, we
did not control for the total supply available through
retail establishments and other auctions. In addition,
the number of bidders was not measurable.
Consequently, the observed price decline anomaly
could be the result of an unobservable increase in
total supply or a decrease in demand for PS3s as the
holiday approached.
CONCLUSION
This study shows that the willingness-to-pay in
eBay auctions of PlayStation 3s during the 2006
Christmas season was significantly related to the
eBay supply of PS3s and the number of days until
Christmas. As hypothesized, the greater the number
of PS3 auctions on eBay ending in the hour or 24
hours around an auction, the lower the high bid. The
existence of a “holiday price decline anomaly” was
also observed in that the high bid was lower for
auctions that ended closer to Christmas.
According to the results of this study, sellers can
obtain higher bids on limited-supply items auctioned
earlier in the holiday season. The reason behind this
behavior may be related to risk aversion. Gift buyers
may be willing to pay a premium for a gift item that
is in short supply to avoid the risk of paying more
later. Also, those bidders who are purchasing
Hanukah gifts are in the market earlier in the holiday
season and, thus, might contribute to a holiday price
decline anomaly by increasing market demand earlier
in the traditional Christmas season.
Of course, one must recognize that some of the
bidders are not purchasing the PS3 as a holiday gift,
but are purchasing it for themselves for immediate
use. Some “gamers” might be willing to pay more
just to be the first to own the new version of a game
system. In that case, there might be an observable
price decline anomaly for any new and popular
entertainment or technologically sophisticated item—
especially one with limited availability. Based on the
extent of such non-holiday gift purchases, the results
of this study may overstate the holiday price decline
anomaly effect. More study needs to be done to better
understand how prices behave during the holiday
season compared to non-holiday periods.

Economists could enhance their understanding of
how markets work by examining how price is
determined in online auctions. Areas of research that
need further study include: 1) comparing the behavior
of prices in online auctions to in-person auctions; 2)
analyzing the behavior of prices during holiday and
non-holiday seasons; and 3) studying the behavior of
prices for different types of products. Compared to
just a few years ago, much more information is
available through market research databases supplied
by eBay and other auction sites. Although these
databases were designed to help sellers better
understand their markets, they are ready-made for
economists studying market behavior. During the
next few years, we anticipate many other studies
about online auction behavior. Hopefully, some will
shed further light on the effect of auction supply on
the willingness-to-pay as well as whether a “holiday
price decline anomaly” exists for other products sold
on Internet auction sites during the Christmas
shopping season.
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retail spending
Table 3
Regression Results Using White Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
Dependent Variable: BID
Independent
Variable
Intercept
SUPPLY1

(1)
448.40***
(13.30)
1.38***
( 0.24)

(2)
462.25***
(13.46)

0.16***
(0.03)
DAYS
12.41***
12.20***
(0.48)
(0.47)
GB
159.03***
155.88***
(7.26)
(7.36)
BUNDLE
152.48***
152.27***
(21.89)
(22.16)
GAME
125.01***
122.75***
(17.18)
(17.37)
CONT
40.77**
39.34**
(17.00)
(17.21)
MOVIE
27.04
25.64
(29.05)
(29.08)
SHIP
0.34***
0.30***
(0.11)
(0.11)
NUMBIDS
0.06
0.01
(0.36)
(0.36)
TIME1
9.01
7.18
(18.22)
(18.27)
TIME2
5.86
6.16
(9.28)
(9.30)
TIME3
10.88
8.35
(8.59)
(8.60)
WKEND
7.01
8.00
(9.03)
(9.07)
Adjusted R2
0.2924
0.2941
SE of Regression
213.8003
213.9087
F-statistic
121.6531
121.2348
Prob (F-stat)
0.0000
0.0000
Note: The standard error appears in parentheses below each coefficient.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level.
** indicates significance at the 5% level.
* indicates significance at the 10% level.
SUPPLY24
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0.005
(0.774)

0.002
(0.887)

0.014
(0.396)
0.016
(0.339)
0.016
(0.329)

0.042
(0.010)

0.045
(0.005)

0.061
(0.000)

0.053
(0.001)

0.024
(0.143)

0.043
(0.008)

0.0040
(0.015)

0.001
(0.931)

GAME

CONT

MOVIE

SHIP

NUMBIDS

TIME1

TIME2

TIME3

0.006
(0.716)

0.003
(0.864)
0.039
(0.015)

0.061
(0.000)

0.106
(0.000)

0.019
(0.240)

0.071
(0.000)

0.019
(0.245)

0.016
(0.311)

0.058
(0.000)

0.007
(0.646)

0.001
(0.950)

0.009
(0.595)

0.003
(0.841)

0.016
(0.330)
0.006
(0.717)

0.035
(0.029)

0.034
(0.034)

0.011
(0.498)

0.005
(0.762)

0.020
(0.222)

0.090
(0.000)

GAME

0.003
(0.832)

0.088
(0.000)

0.002
(0.888)

0.024
(0.146)

0.024
(0.134)

0.016
(0.314)

0.011
(0.499)

BUNDLE

0.008
(0.606)

0.001
(0.949)

0.012
(0.476)

0.014
(0.401)

0.045
(0.005)

0.002
(0.890)

0.085
(0.000)

0.259
(0.000)

CONT

0.014
(0.402)

0.012
(0.467)

0.035
(0.030)

0.009
(0.575)

0.040
(0.015)

0.003
(0.838)

0.021
(0.196)

MOVIE

0.005
(0.747)

0.014
(0.386)

0.002
(0.924)

0.005
(0.738)

0.007
(0.649)

0.002
(0.878)

SHIP

0.018
(0.257)

0.000
(0.992)

0.013
(0.435)

0.001
(0.975)

0.063
(0.000)

NUMBIDS

0.013
(0.438)

0.022
(0.179)

0.020
(0.229)

0.015
(0.344)

TIME1

0.018
(0.257)

0.187
(0.000)

0.142
(0.000)

TIME2

0.162
(0.000)

0.449
(0.000)

TIME3

0.055
(0.001)

WKEND

The p-value is shown in parentheses underneath the Pearson correlation coefficient. A p-value equal to or less than 0.01 indicates significance at the 1% level; 0.05
indicates significance at the 5% level; 0.10 indicates significance at the 10% level.

#

0.010
(0.553)

0.032
(0.048)

0.040
(0.014)

BUNDLE

0.011
(0.498)

0.016
(0.327)

0.007
(0.656)

GB

0.028
(0.086)

0.107
(0.000)

0.046
(0.005)

DAYS

0.128
(0.000)

0.347
(0.000)

0.401
(0.000)

SUPPLY24

GB

0.624
(0.000)

DAYS

SUPPLY1

SUPPLY24

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients of Independent Variables
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